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ELIMINATING  RUNAWAY  INFLATION: 
LESSONS  FROM  THE  GERMAN  HYPERINFLATION 
Thomas  M.  Humphrey 
The  German  hyperinflation  of  1923  is  a  classic 
example  of  what  can  happen  when  the  monetary 
authorities  let  themselves  be  guided  by  false  and  mis- 
leading  theories.  In  this  case  the  fallacious  theories 
included  ( 1)  an  external  shock  or  balance  of  pay- 
ments  theory  of  inflation  and  exchange  rate  depreci- 
ation,  (2)  a  reverse  causation  theory  of  the  link 
between  money  and  prices,  (3)  the  notion  that  the 
real  money  stock  rather  than  the  nominal  money 
stock  is  the  appropriate  indicator  of monetary  ease  or 
tightness,  (4)  the  real  bills  doctrine  according  to 
which  the  money  supply  should  accommodate  itself  to 
the  needs  of  trade,  and  (5)  the idea  that  the  central 
bank  can  stabilize  nominal  market  interest  rates 
simply  by  pegging  its  discount  rate  at  some  arbitrary 
level. 
Misleading  Theories  The  authorities  adhered  to 
these  theories  to  a  ludicrous  degree.  For  example, 
at  the  height  of  the  inflation  when  a  postage  stamp 
and  a newspaper  cost  90  billion  marks  and  200  billion 
marks  respectively,  and  when  the  money  supply  was 
expanding  at  a  rate  of  1300  percent  per  month  and 
30  paper  mills  were  working  overtime  just  to  keep 
the  Reichsbank  supplied  with  paper  for  its  banknotes, 
the  authorities  were  actually  insisting  that  money 
growth  had  nothing  to  do  with  inflation.  On  the 
contrary,  they  blamed  inflation  on  external  nonmone- 
tary  factors  and  declared  that  money  growth  was  the 
consequence  not  the  cause  of  inflation.  Like  modern 
government  officials  who  attribute  our  present  infla- 
tion  to  the  machinations  of  the  OPEC  cartel,  they 
located  the  source  of inflation  in  the  postwar  punitive 
actions  of  the  Allies.  More  specifically,  they  traced  a 
chain  of  causation  running  from  reparations  burdens 
to  balance  of  payments  deficits  to  exchange  rate 
depreciation  to  rising  import  prices  and  thence  to 
general  price  inflation  to  rising  money  demand  and 
finally  to  the  money  stock  itself.  That  is,  they  argued 
that  external  shocks  operating  through  the  balance 
of  payments  caused  the  inflation,  that  the  resulting 
rise  in  prices  created  a  need  for  more  money  on  the 
part  of business  and  government  to  carry  on  the  same 
level  of  real  transactions,  and  that  it  was  the  duty  of 
the  Reichsbank  to  accommodate  this  need,  a  duty 
which  it  could  accomplish  without  affecting  prices. 
Far  from  seeing  currency  expansion  as  the  source  of 
inflation,  they  argued  that  it  was  the  solution  to  the 
acute  shortage  of  money  caused  by  skyrocketing 
prices.  In  this  connection  they  advanced  the  peculiar 
theory  that  monetary  excess  could  not  possibly  be 
the  source  of  German  inflation  since  the  real  or  price- 
deflated  value  of  the  German  money  stock  was 
smaller  than  it  had  been  before  the  inflation  started. 
They  failed  to  realize  that  excessive  nominal  money 
growth  itself  was  responsible  for  the  shrinkage  in  the 
real  money  stock.  They  did  not  see  that  inflationary 
monetary  growth,  by  generating  expectations  of 
future  inflation  (expectations  that  constitute  the  an- 
ticipated  depreciation  cost  of  holding  money)  had 
greatly  reduced  the  demand  for  money  and  had  stimu- 
lated  a corresponding  rise  in  velocity.  This  inflation- 
induced  rise  in  velocity  had  caused  prices  to  rise 
faster  than  the  nominal  ‘money  stock  thus  producing 
the  observed  shrinkage  in  the  real  money  stock  (see 
chart  on  following  page).  This  sequence  of  events, 
however,  was  beyond  their  comprehension.  Hence 
even  though  the  nominal  money  stock  was  several 
trillion  times  larger  than  at  the  beginning  of  the  infla- 
tion,  they  argued  that  it  was  still  not  large  enough  be- 
cause  prices  had  actually  risen  faster  than  the  money 
stock.  They  thought  that  they  could  prevent  further 
shrinkage  of  the  real  money  stock  by  increasing  the 
nominal  money  stock.  In  so  doing  they  succumbed  to 
the  fallacy  that  the  policymakers  can  systematically 
control  real  economic  variables  (e.g.,  the  real  money 
stock)  by  controlling  nominal  economic  variables 
(e.g.,  the  nominal  money  stock). 
Real  Bills  Doctrine  Another  fallacious  theory  to 
which  they  adhered  was  the  real  bills  or  needs  of 
trade  doctrine,  which  says  that  money  can  never  be 
excessive  as  long  as  it  is  issued  against  bank  loans 
made  to  finance  real  transactions  in  goods  and  ser- 
vices.  What  they  overlooked  was  that  the  demand 
for  loans  also  depends  on  the  level  of  prices  at  which 
those  real  transactions  are  effected.  They  forget  that 
rising  prices  would  require  an  ever-growing  volume 
of  loans  just  to  finance  the  same  level  of  real  trans- 
actions.  Under  the  real  bills  criterion  these  loans 
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fore  expand.  In  this  manner  price  inflation  would 
generate  the  very  monetary  expansion  necessary  to 
sustain  it  and  the  real  bills  criterion  would  not  limit 
the  quantity  of  money  in  existence.  In  short,  they 
failed  to  understand  that  the  real  bills  criterion  cannot 
distinguish  between  the  price  and  output  components 
of  economic  activity  and  therefore  constitutes  no  bar 
to  the  inflationary  overissue  of  money. 
Inflationary  Discount  Rate  Policy  They  also 
made  the  mistake  of  pegging  the  discount  rate  at  a 
level  of  90  percent,  which  they  regarded  as  consti- 
tuting  an  appropriate  degree  of  monetary  tightness 
at  a  time  when  the  market  rate  of  interest  on  bank 
loans  was  more  than  7300  percent  per  year.  This 
huge  interest  differential  of  course  made  it  extremely 
profitable  for  banks  to  rediscount  bills  with  the 
Reichsbank  and  then  to  loan  out  the  proceeds,  thereby 
producing  additional  inflationary  expansions  of  the 
money  supply  and  further  upward  pressure  on  in- 
terest  rates.  If  the  monetary  authorities  recognized 
this,  however,  they  said  nothing  about  it. 
Monetary  Reform  Measures  But  I  do  not  intend 
to  dwell  on  the  hyperinflation  per  se.  Rather  I  wish 
to  discuss  the  very  successful  monetary  reform  that 
ended  it  in  a prompt  and  relatively  painless  manner- 
an  accomplishment  that  seems  beyond  our  powers 
today.  Regarding  the  monetary  reform  the  facts  are 
as  follows.  On  November  15,  1923  the  government 
announced  that  it  intended  to  get  inflation  under 
control.  Acting  quickly,  it  did  four  things. 
l First,  it  transferred  responsibility  for  mone- 
tary  control  from  the  Reichsbank  to  Dr.  Hjal- 
mar  H.  Schacht,  the  newly  appointed  Com- 
missioner  for  the  National  Currency. 
l Second,  it  issued  a  new  currency  called  the 
Rentenmark  to  circulate  with  the  old  currency. 
The  Rentenmark  was  declared  to  be  equal  in 
value  to  one  prewar  gold  mark  or  one  trillion 
depreciated  paper  marks. 
l  Third,  it  established  a  fixed  upper  limit  on 
the  amount  of  Rentenmarks  that  could  be 
issued.  According  to  Costantino  Bresciani- 
Turroni,  perhaps  the  leading  authority  on  the 
hyperinflation  episode,  this  limitation  was  cru- 
cial  to  the  success  of  the  monetary  reform-1 
1 Costantino  Bresciani-Turroni,  The  Economics  of  In- 
flation  (New  York:  Augustus  Kelley,  1968), pp.  347-348, 
402. 
l Fourth,  it  directed  the  Reichsbank  to  stop  the 
discounting  of  Treasury  bills,  which  meant  in 
effect  that  the  Reichsbank  would  issue  no 
more  paper  money  for  the  government. 
The  Miracle  of the  Rentenmark  The  reform  was 
an  instant  success.  The  new  currency  was  in  great 
demand  and  circulated  at  its  declared  gold  value. 
Within  weeks  the  rate  of  inflation,  which  had  been 
raging  at  an  annual  rate  of  300,000  percent,  dropped 
to  virtually  zero.  And  this  was  accomplished  at  a 
cost  of  only  10  percent  lost  potential  output  in  1924, 
the  year  following  the  monetary  reform.2 
To  get  an  idea  of  the  magnitude  of  this  accom- 
plishment  were  it  to  be  attempted  today,  we  can  use 
the  late  Arthur  Okun’s  rule  of  thumb  calculation 
(which  he  derived  from  evaluating  simulations  from 
six  econometric  models)  that  the  cost  in  terms  of 
lost  output  per  each  1 percentage  point  reduction  in 
the  rate  of  inflation  is  10. percent  of  a  year’s  GNP. 
According  to  Okun’s  10  percent  rule,  it  should  have 
required  a  50  percent  GNP  gap  sustained  for  600 
centuries  to  eliminate  Germany’s  300,000  percent 
inflation  rate.3  In  fact,  however,  the  German  infla- 
tion  was  virtually  eliminated  by  early  1924  at  the 
cost  of  only  a  10 percent  GNP  gap. 
How  did  they  do  it?  How  did  the  German  author- 
ities  manage  to  eliminate  an  inflation  that  was  infi- 
nitely  worse  than  ours  today  and  yet  do  it  so  quickly 
and  painlessly?  What  recipe  for  success  did  they 
have  that  our  authorities  lack  today?  Most  observers 
correctly  note  that  the  key  to  stopping  the  inflation 
was  the  eradication  of  inflationary  expectations  and 
the  restoration  of confidence  in  the  German  currency. 
But  they  offer  only  the  vaguest  of  explanations  as  to 
why  that  confidence  was  so  easily  restored,  attrib- 
uting  it  either  to  a  yearning  of  the  German  national 
spirit  for  monetary  order  and  stability  or  to  a  naive 
belief  on  the  part  of  the  public  that  the  new  Renten- 
mark  was  worth  one  prewar  gold  mark  simply  be- 
cause  it  was  declared  to  be  worth  that  much  on  the 
face  of  the  note. 
The  Credibility  Hypothesis  There  is,  however, 
a  more  plausible  explanation  that  stresses  the  credi- 
bility  associated  with  the  government’s  policy  declara- 
tions.  According  to  that  explanation,  when  the 
2 Frank  D.  Graham,  Exchange,  Prices,  and  Production  in 
Hyperinflation:  Germany,  1920-1923  (Princeton:  Prince- 
ton  University  Press,  1930),  p.  319. 
3 The  computation  is  Roy  Webb’s.  See  his  article,  “De- 
pression  or  Price  Controls:  A  Fictitious  Dilemma  For 
Anti-Inflation  Policy,”  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Rich- 
mond,  Economic  Review 66  (May/June  1980),  p.  4. 
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intention  to  halt  inflation,  the  public  was  fully  con- 
vinced  and  accordingly  swiftly  revised  downward  its 
expectations  of  future  inflation.  People  believed  the 
government  not  only  because  it  had  placed  the  re- 
sponsibility  for  stabilization  in  new  hands  but  also 
because  prior  to  the  monetary  reform  it  had  taken 
decisive  steps  to  reduce  the  budgetary  deficits  that 
were  an  immediate  cause  of  inflationary  money 
growth.4  Consisting  of  drastic  cuts  in  expenditures 
(particularly  welfare  relief  to  striking  workers)  and 
the  levying  of  taxes  in  real  (i.e.,  gold)  rather  than 
nominal  terms,  these  measures  were  widely  regarded 
as  an  essential  prerequisite  to  monetary  stabilization 
and  a  clear  indication  of  the  government’s  intention 
to  end  inflation.  People  also  believed  the  government 
because  it  had  not  tried  to  mislead  the  public  during 
the  preceding  hyperinflation.  True,  the  officials  had 
misunderstood  the  cause  of  the  hyperinflation.  But 
they  at  least  had  not  lied  to  the  public  about  the  policy 
rule  they  were  following  at  the  time.  On  the  con- 
trary,  throughout  the  inflationary  episode  the  authori- 
ties  candidly  acknowledged  that  their  main  policy 
objective  was  to  accommodate  inflation  with  sufficient 
monetary  growth  to  overcome  inflation-induced 
shortages  of  money  and  to  stabilize  the  real  value  of 
the  money  stock.  In  this  connection  Reichsbank 
president  Rudolf  Havenstein  even  boasted  of  the 
installation  of  new  high-speed  currency  printing 
presses  that  would  enable  money  growth  to  keep  up 
with  skyrocketing  prices. 
Because  the  authorities  had  instituted  budget  re- 
forms  compatible  with  monetary  stability  and  because 
they  had  not  lied  to  the  public  about  the  policy  rule 
in  effect  during  the  preceding  hyperinflation,  there 
was  ample  reason  for  the  public  to  believe  the  au- 
thorities’  announced  intention  to  change  the  policy 
rule  and  halt  inflationary  money  growth.  Conse- 
quently,  inflationary  expectations  were  swiftly  revised 
to  zero  when  the  halt  was  announced,  thereby  allow- 
ing  the  speedy  removal  of  inflation  without  large 
increases  in  lost  ouput.  Evidently,  policy  credibility 
was  essential  to  the  reversal  of  inflationary  expecta- 
tions  and  the  resulting  rapid  termination  of  inflation. 
4 On  this  point  see  Ragnar  Nurkse’s  comments  in  The 
Course  and  Control  of  Inflation  (Geneva:  League  of 
Nations,  1946),  pp.  22-23,  68-73.  Nurkse  stresses  the 
contribution  made  by  the  fiscal  reforms  to  the  success  of 
the  stabilization  of  the  mark.  In  particular.  he  notes  that, 
since  budget  deficits  were  largely-financed  by  inflationary 
money  growth,  decisive  steps  to  reduce  those  deficits  and 
bring  the  budget  under  control  improved  the  prospects 
for  monetary  stabilization  and  thereby  lowered  inflation- 
ary  expectations. 
Lessons  of  the  Monetary  Reform  There  are  at 
least  three  lessons  to  be  learned  from  the  monetary 
reform  that  ended  the  German  hyperinflation.  First, 
the  task  of  subduing  inflation  is  easier 
l if  the  policymakers  have  established  a  record 
of  credibility, 
l if  they  accurately  convey  their  intentions  to 
the  public,  and 
l if  they  convince  the  public  of  their  resolve  to 
stop  inflation. 
Unfortunately,  these  ingredients  have  been  sadly  lack- 
ing  in  many  countries  in  recent  years  where  anti- 
inflation  rhetoric  has  been  accompanied  by  steady 
and  persistent  increases  in  the  basic  trend  rate  of 
inflation. 
Credible  Policy  Strategies  A  second  lesson  to  be 
learned  from  the  German  stabilization  episode  is  that 
a  credible  anti-inflation  policy  must  focus  on  a  single 
objective,  namely  the  elimination  of  inflation.”  A 
shifting-targets  policy  that  focuses  now  on  inflation, 
now  on  unemployment,  now  on  interest  rates  or  the 
foreign  exchange  value  of  the  dollar  or  still  some 
other  objective  will  be  largely  ineffective  in  fighting 
inflation.  The  public,  having  observed  the  past  tend- 
ency  of  the  authorities  to  shift  from  one  policy  ob- 
jective  to  another,  will  expect  monetary  restraint  to 
be  abandoned  upon  the  first  signs  of  economic  slack 
as  monetary  policy  shifts  from  fighting  inflation  to 
fighting  unemployment.  Knowing  that  monetary  re- 
straint  will  be  temporary,  wage  and  price  setters  will 
have  no  incentive  to  accept  lower  rates  of  wage  and 
price  increases  when  such  restraint  occurs.  As  a 
result,  the  inflation  rate  will  respond  but  little  to  the 
short-lived  efforts  to  reduce  it. 
The  preceding  should  not  be  taken  to  imply  that 
inflation  is  inherently  resistant  to  all  policy  strategies. 
On  the  contrary,  were  the  government  to  drop  its 
shifting-targets  policy  strategy  for  one  devoted  solely 
to  eliminating  inflation,  the  inflation  rate  might  sub- 
side  rapidly  once  the  public  was  convinced  that  a  true 
anti-inflation  policy  was  in  force.  Confronted  with  a 
new  policy  environment,  economic  agents  would  have 
an  incentive  to  alter  their  wage-  and  price-setting 
behavior  in  a  manner  consistent  with  rapid  adjust- 
ment  to  lower  rates  of  inflation. 
The  third  lesson  is  that  we  should  be  wary  of pessi- 
mistic  conclusions  that  inflation  can  only  be  removed 
5 What  follows  draws  heavily  from  Webb,  op.  cit.,  p.  5. 
6  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JULY/AUGUST  1980 at  the  cost  of  a  protracted  and  painful  recession. 
Those  conclusions  often  are  derived  from  econometric 
models  estimated  for  the  period  when  the  govern- 
ment’s  shifting-targets  policy  was  in  effect.  These 
models  usually  assume  that  economic  agents  will  not 
change  their  wage-  and  price-setting  strategies  when 
the  policy  environment  changes.  This  assumption,  is 
questionable.  For  as  mentioned  above,  if  the  focus  of 
monetary  policy  were  to  change  from  a  shifting- 
targets  strategy  to  one  of  permanently  eliminating 
inflation,  the  context  in  which  wage  and  price  deci- 
sions  are  made  would  be  drastically  altered.  Re- 
sponding  to  the  new  policy  environment,  people 
would  adjust  their  expectational  and  price-setting  be- 
havior  accordingly.  Consequently,  inflation  would  be 
less  intractable  and  costly  to  subdue  than  in  the  past 
and  the  inflation  rate  could  be  brought  down  more 
swiftly  and  painlessly  than  indicated  by  the  econo- 
metric  models.  The  trick  of  course  would  be  in  con- 
vincing  the  public  that  the  policy  environment  had 
indeed  changed.  But  this  could  be  done  if the  policy- 
makers  were  to  announce  anti-inflation  targets  and 
then  demonstrate  that  they  were  meeting  those  tar- 
gets.  Given  a  successful  track  record  of  meeting 
stated  anti-inflation  targets,  policy  credibility  would 
be  restored  thus  making  it  easier  to  get  inflation 
under  control. 
Conclusion  The  preceding  has  enumerated  three 
lessons  taught  by  the  stabilization  episode  that  ended 
the  German  hyperinflation.  Whether  modern  policy- 
makers  will  ever  consistently  apply  these  lessons  re- 
mains  to  be  seen.  Certainly  the  post-World  War  II 
policy  record  in  many  countries  is  hardly  encouraging 
on  this  score,  indicating  as  it does a  tendency  for  the 
lessons  to  be  more  often  forgotten  than  remembered. 
Over  the  past  year,  however,  there  are  signs  that  the 
authorities  both  at  home  and  abroad  may  have  started 
to  apply  the  lessons  and  that  they  may  have  aban- 
doned  their  old  shifting-targets  policy  of  responding 
to  the  most  pressing  short-run  concerns  for  a  new 
longer  run  policy  of  eliminating  inflation.  The  cur- 
rent  recession,  bringing  pressures  on  the  policymak- 
ers  to  shift  from  fighting  inflation  to  fighting  unem- 
ployment,  should  reveal  whether  this  is  in  fact  the 
case.  So  should  the  ensuing  recovery  when  the 
central  bank  undoubtedly  will  be  called  upon  to  ac- 
celerate  money  growth  to  keep  interest  rates  from 
rising.  If  the  authorities  can  resist  these  pressures 
and  stick  to  their  longer  term  policy  of  eliminating 
inflation  they  will  have  shown  that  they  have  indeed 
learned  the  lessons  of  the  German  hyperinflation. 
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